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ReviewArticle
The New SovietHistory
Daniel T. Orlovsky

Southern
MethodistUniversity

ThefieldsoflateImperial
havereacheda newplateau.
RussianandSoviethistory
Recentscholarship-particularly
in theareasof socialhistory
of lateImperial
of 1917,andthepost-1917
Russia,thehistoriography
oftheRussianrevolutions
oftheSovietUnion-hasbroken
newconceptual
history
ground
and,at leastin
thecase of post-1917history,
has openedentirenew areasof enquiry.
These
developments
oftenhaverunwellaheadofcorresponding
inthecurrent
openings
Sovietdiscourseof historians
and publicists.
has beento
There,thetendency
blamepresent-day
and moralfailuresof thepartyon Stalinand his
problems
personal
regimeandon the"administrative
command"system.'It is convenient
tobeginSoviethistory
in 1928or 1929withStalin's"greatchange,"butitis the
of theformative
investigation
yearsof Sovietpower,whichmustincludethe
revolutionary
tradition
goingbackto 1905-7 and 1917through
theendof the
thatwill supplythe insightintobasic Sovietpoliticaland social
twenties,
institutions.
intheUSSR begunto
Onlyveryrecently
haveprofessional
historians
call forabandoning
thehoaryofficial
of theOctoberRevolution
historiography
andreassessing
theroleofLenin.2Withtheeventsofthepasteighteen
months
in
EastemEuropeandtheSovietUnion,somehavealready
proclaimed
"theendof
history"and havearguedthatone neednotbotherexplaining
howtheSoviet
Unioncameto be, howitsbasicsocialandpoliticalinstitutions
or
(totalitarian
howtheydeveloped,
not)werecreated,
andhowtheylaunched
andnurtured
the
processes
thathavebrought
us tothepresent
watershed.
It is as ifbylabelingthe
perioda totalitarian
or utopiandisaster
one is no longerrequired
to explainits
sourcesorhowitworked.
Thisis a peculiarform
ofmoralblindness,
foritsurely
1 A good summary
of the discussionin the Soviet Union and the basicallyconservative
approachof thehistorical
to themajorissuesof Soviethistory
profession
maybe foundin Mark
von Hagen, "Historyand PoliticsunderGorbachev:Professional
Autonomy
and DemocratizaForum1 (1988): 1-8. See also AleksandrNekrich,"Perestroika
tion,"HarrimanInstitute
in
History:The FirstPhase," Survey30, no. 4 (June1989): 22-43.
2 See V. Startsev,
"Istoriiaoktiabria
v noveisheiliterature,"
Kommunist
15 (1988): 117-21;
P. Volobuev,"Obrashchaias'k velikomuopytu:sovremennye
zadachii metodologiia
izucheniia
16 (1988): 90- 101. Fora particularly
oktiabria,"Kommunist
bold discussionof theoriginsof
Stalinismthatplaces itsrootsdeeplyin theperiod1917-24 (a view thatderivesthenatureof
Stalinismfromthemoralshortcomings
of bolshevismas ideologyand theearlypracticesand
policiesof theBolshevikregimeunderLenin), see A. Tsypko,"Istoki Stalinizma,"Nauka i
zhizn'(November-December
1988), pp. 40-48.
[JournalofModernHistory62 (December1990): 831-850]

? 1990 by The University
of Chicago.0022-2801/90/6204-0006$01.00
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will bluntour criticalfacultiesand preventus fromunderstanding
similar
phenomena
wherever
theymayoccur.
In theWest,thefieldof Soviethistory
has beenmarked
bytwoparadigmatic
shifts,the firstfromthe eclecticismthatproducedthe handfulof first-rate
life-and-times
biographies
ofrevolutionary
leadersandthebasicpolitical
histories
centeredaroundthe Communist
partyto social historybroadlyconceived
whatis nowcalledthe"newcultural
(embracing
history"),
andthesecondfrom
of ImperialRussiaand the 1917 revolutions
thehistory
to thehistory
of the
post-1917
Sovietperioditself.Theseshifts
havebeenpropelled
bynewquestions
andtheuse of newsources,butby no meanshavechanging
scholarly
fashions
producedconsensuson key historical
issuesof therevolutionary
era (19001930). Such basic questionsas theoriginsof Bolshevikauthoritarianism,
the
natureof theStalinregime,thequestionof "altematives,"
thecontours
of the
basicsocialmovements
oftheeraandtheirconnection
topoliticsandculture
are
stillveryhotlydebateddespitethe growingliterature
thattakesrevolution
(conceivedof as completedtransformation)
as its pointof departure.
There
remains
a problem
ofperspective,
ofpinning
downdegreeandkindin speaking
of theinfluence
of theprerevolutionary
paston revolutionary
outcomes.The
problem
of continuity-or,
to use Lenin'sterm,"survivals"(perezhitki)-has
notbeensolveddespitetheheroicefforts
ofhistorians
convinced
thatrevolutionis to be understood
in its own terms.Basic conceptsand
arytransformation
suchas stateversussociety,totalitarianism,
categories,
and "civil
Stalinism,
society,"
havebeendeconstructed,
tomdown,unmasked,
andrebuilt
leavingonly
thevaguestsenseofclosureonthedebates.Theinterested
readerfacesa growing
mass of publications
realmof
(a good numberof themoutsidetheordinary
academicdiscourseand moreproperly
eitheras publitsistika
or as
categorized
whatusedto be knownas "unofficial
history")andtheacademicworksunder
reviewhereprovideclearexamplesofcurrent
andsomeweaknesses
of
strengths
a verydynamic
field.I shouldemphasize
attheoutsetthattheseacademicworks
andtodeependiscussion-farther
thansomeof
go fartoadvanceourknowledge
on in print
ofStalinism,
therecentdebatescarried
on thenature
thegreatterror,
andthelike.3
I. RESTORING
THEREVOLUTIONARY
TRADrITON

In therushto exploitnewopeningsin post-1917Soviethistory,
scholarshave
to thedangerof ignoring
thefoundations
ofthesubject-the
nearlysuccumbed
revolutionary
processesthatled to thecollapseof theOld Regimein February
1917andtheestablishment
ofSovietpowerinOctober.4It is gratifying,
then,to
TimMcDaniel's
readtheworkof Abraham
Ascheron the1905-7 revolution,
3 See especiallythe debatesin the Russian Review45 (1986): 357-413 and 46 (1987):
375-431.
4 Most graduatestudents
in majorRussianhistoryprogramsthesedays choose to writeon
post-1917topics,especiallyfocusingon the 1920s and 1930s. Originalresearchon the Old
on the 1917 revolutions
is now rare.
Regimeor,moresurprising,
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inrevolutionary
historical
andsociological
analysisofthelaborquestion
Russia,
in thearmyduringthe
and AllanWildman'ssecondvolumeon therevolution
summer
andautumn
of 1917. A fourth
book,RichardAbraham's
hagiographic
studyofAlexander
is farless rewarding.5
Kerensky,
Ascheroffers
a thoughtful
andelegantstudyonwhatmustbe thestarting
point
forcomingto termswithrevolution
in twentieth-century
Russia.The eventsof
1905-7 constituted
inthecitiesandcountryside
a violent
upheaval
anda powerful
merging
ofrevolutionary
socialforcesdrawn
from
blue-andwhite-collar
artisans,
workers,
thefreeprofessions
and intelligentsia,
and thepeasantry.
It shaped
fundamental
attitudes,
andinstitutions-the
newpolitical
ideologies,
trade
parties,
unions,andSoviets,as wellas thequasi-constitutional
launched
system
bythe
October
Manifesto
andthepoliciesoftheautocracy,
thoseofStolypin,
including
forexample-andwas in everysensea powerful
modelfortheactorsof 1917.
Ascherhasproduced
a masterful
in narrative
formofthe1905events.
synthesis
(A secondvolumewillcover1906-7.)
The 1905revolution
was indeed"unique" and "unprecedented
in scale and
ferocity."6
Fromits originsin the social fragmentation
generated
by rapid
inanagrarian
industrialization
andthegrowing
society
between
hostility
educated
elitesand the bureaucratic
and military
foundations
of tsaristauthority,
the
revolution-which
reallybegan in the autumnof 1904 withthe banquet
campaignsof "liberal" intelligentsia
and professionals-cut
a bloodyswathe
Russiathatmomentarily
through
unitedthetwinstreams
oftheplebian(workers,
peasants,white-collar
and liberalsocial movements.
workers)
To thisvolatile
mixture
wasaddedthegrievances
ofthenationalities.
Ascherwellunderstands
the
ambiguous
outcome
ofthe1905events,whichresulted
in "onlya partialvictory
fortheopposition."Forhim,1905 produced"no fundamental
changesin the
economic
andsocialstructure
ofsociety"andpolitical
changes"so general"that
theirultimate
couldonlybe workedoutin theless thanfavorable
significance
circumstances
of post-1905autocratic
retrenchment
and the experiments
of
Stolypin.
Ascherdownplays
thepowerofsocialmovements
in 1905andadvances
such traditional
for the ambiguousoutcomesas the stubborn
explanations
unwillingness
of theautocrat
(andcertainkeysupporters
of "unlimited
autocracy") to maketimelyconcessions,
thelack of coordination
(notto mention
different
of thesocialand nationalmovements,
interests)
and "society'sdeep
distrust
of theauthorities,"
which,whencombinedwiththelack of political
of ministers
experience
and opposition
leadersalike,led to thepartyleaders
missingtheopportunity
to join a Wittecabinetin the fall of 1905. In The
Revolution
of1905 Ascherprovides
thefullpanoplyof eventsandmovements,
yetthereadercomesawayfeelingsomewhat
shortchanged
by thelackof new
5 AbrahamAscher,The Revolution
of 1905: Russia in Disarray(Stanford,Calif., 1988),
Ascher'sbookwillbe followedwitha secondvolumecoveringthecontinuation
oftherevolution
andrestoration
ofauthority
in 1906-7; TimMcDaniel,Autocracy,
Capitalismand Revolution
in
Russia (Berkeleyand Los Angeles,1988); AllanK. Wildman,TheEnd oftheRussianImperial
vol. 2, TheRoad to SovietPowerand Peace (Princeton,
Army,
N.J., 1987); RichardAbraham,
AlexanderKerensky:TheFirstLove of theRevolution
(New York,1987).
6
Ascher,p. 341.
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interpretations
andthefailure
toestablish
somesortofhierarchy
intheimpactof
socialfactors
uponpolitics.
Theambiguities
of 1905-7 worked
themselves
outintherevolutions
of 1917.
Theautocracy
collapsedundertheweight
ofWorldWarI andthemassdiscontent
of workers,
peasants,andthearmy.The "liberals"didcometo power,ifonly
and thevariouspartiesand social movements
briefly,
crystallized
aroundthe
discourse
ofclassstruggle.
In 1917,however,
theplebeiansturned
thetableson
"propertied"Russia and all thoseabove themin the workplaceand social
hierarchies.
Fueledbymassivepeasantunrest,
a remarkably
well-organized
labor
movement
thatembraced
bothblue-andwhite-collar
workers,
andthecontinuing
inthearmy(andnavy),theOctoberRevolution
revolution
produced
a Bolshevik
or "Sovietpower,"whichcan be seenat leastin politicaltermsas
government,
a resolution
oftheproblem
ofunstable
statepowerdating
backtothe1905period.
TheOctoberRevolution,
whichofcoursecannotbe reducedtoeventsinOctober
1917,was a seminalprocessin twentieth-century
history
notsimplybecauseit
becamea globalmodelforplebeianrevolution
butalso becauseitcontained
the
of theSoviet
originsof thebasic social, economic,and politicalinstitutions
Union.Thetruly
exciting
openings
intoSoviethistory
musttakeas theirpointof
therevolutionary
in October.
departure
processesthatcameto fruition
Here McDaniel'sbold conceptualworkmakesan important
contribution.
on socialtheory,
theunlikely
butuncommonly
fruitful
Drawing
heavily
including
combination
of Tocquevilleand Trotsky,
McDanieldevelopsa sophisticated
aboutthe uniquenessof Russia's labormovement,
a "combined"
argument
thatwas markedby an "exceptionalthoughunevenmilitancy
movement
and
totheTrotskyite
solidarity"
(p. 51). He tracesthesourceofthesecharacteristics
ofeconomic
of"autocratic
a form
notion
thatpromoted
capitalism,"
development
fora unitary
a thirst
worldview
eventhough
theirsocialreality
amongworkers
was markedby fragmentation
andtheirorganizations
In 1917,
by atomization.
werestrongly
attracted
to socialism,and eventually
to theBolshevik
workers
to rejectliberal
variant,in partbecausetheyhad alreadybeen conditioned
politics,the rule of law, and parliamentary
procedureand had foundvery
or antistate.
attractive
a view of statepowerthatwas by no meansanarchist
classwishedfora strong
statethatwouldprotect
themand
Indeed,theworking
of
ForMcDaniel,thelanguageandreality
represent
onlytheirownclassinterest.
in 1917,butnotina crudely
wereindeedthemotor
forcesofhistory
classconflict
sense.Russia'sworkers
wereneither
theanarchic
massportrayed
deterninistic
by
andright-wingers
northeself-conscious
theMensheviks,
classdescribed
liberals,
into
andsomerecentlaborhistorians.
The workers
bytheBolsheviks
organized
a "combinedmovement
quiteunitedin itsradicalism,
yetsociallyfragmented"
ofthe
(p. 351). HereMcDanielslipsintothedeterminist
camp.Giventhenature
neither
the
Russianlabormovement
andthestructures
within
whichitoperated,
northeProvisional
everreallyhada chance.McDaniel
Mensheviks
Government
theMensheviks
andtheProvisional
goesoutofhiswaytoexonerate
Government,
andlogicalpositions
thatcouldnotgainworking-class
withtheirwell-conceived
tookadvantage
ofthesituation
andoffered
a breakwith
allegiance.Bolshevism
staticmodelofmodernization
"basedon a rigiddoctrine
thepast,a consistently
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of harmony."
For McDaniel,Bolshevismplayedupon the centralizing
and
inthelabormovement
bureaucratic
tendencies
andsucceededin
alreadyinherent
theaftermath
ofOctober
invirtually
of"civilsociety."
destroying
anynotion
But
againMcDanielrejectstheideathatRussianhistory
ina linearfashion,
developed
fromthepolicestateof thetsarsto thatof theSoviets.He is interested
in the
texture
ofchange,intheunusualcombination
ofcapitalism
andtradition
thatled
to a "new andinsolublesetof socialandpoliticalchallenges."The historian's
missionis to document
andunderstand
thosechallenges.
TheworksofWildman
andAbraham
providea studyincontrasting
stylesand
subjectmatter.
IfWildman
carriesthebanner
ofthesocialhistorians
whoreveal
thepowerofthe"revolution
frombelow,"Abraham
is a throwback
toan earlier
historiography
thatproduced
oftherevolution's
biographies
leadersandignored
societyaltogether.
Wildmancarriesouthis mandate
farmoresuccessfully.
The
secondvolumeofhismagisterial
TheEndoftheRussianImperial
offers
a
Army
vividpanorama
of theworkings
of thecommittee
structure
in thearmyand is
arguablythe best case studyyetof the institutional/social
nexusthatmade
October
possible.Herewe see theworkings
ofa nascent"civilsociety"brought
inthecrucible
forth
andnurtured
ofrevolution.
Wildman
showsthericharrayof
socialforcesat workin thevariousarmycommittees
andtheirresponseto the
politicalissuesoftheperiod.Themaximalism
ofmanysoldiersandofficers
was
tempered
bya desireforstructure
andorderas wellas a burning
questforsocial
justice.
Abraham,
unfortunately,
is handicapped
byhis subject,Alexander
Kerensky,
who despitehis enormousvisibility
in 1917 produceda recordof political
ineptitude,
theoretical
primitiveness,
andevendeviousness
thatmakeitdifficult
to
enshrine
him,evenifonlysentimentally,
as a hero.Abraham
nonetheless
triesto
do so witha considerable
amountofenergyandgoodwill.He does succeedin
forthefirst
bringing
together
timeinanylanguage
thesalientfactsanda gooddeal
ofthepathosofKerensky's
life,though
thesefactsdo notatall provetheauthor's
point.For example,Abrahamperforms
an important
serviceby layingout
Kerensky'smanyorganizational
activitiesin the revolutionary
underground
duringthewarpriorto theFebruary
Revolution.
But his evidencein no way
justifies
theassertion
thatKerensky
wasRussia'sleadingrevolutionary
during
the
war.
The dateOctober1917 has servedto separateartificially
therevolutionary
tradition
and an entirerangeof social and culturalmovements
fromtheir
evolution
andfateunderSovietpower.Thatis whywe mustnotlose sightofthe
rootsof Soviethistory
in the late Imperialperiodand in 1917-hence the
importance
of theworksdiscussedaboveforthestudyof Soviethistory
proper.
Thosewho wantto restore
or create"civil society"in today'sSovietUnion
woulddo well to examinecarefully
the recordof social activismand civic
consciousness
displayed
by a widevariety
of socialgroupsfrom1905through
1917. The failureof the democratically
orientedcivic elementsin 1917 is
perhapstheprincipal
tragedy
of thatRevolution.
The reasonsfortheirfailure
transcend
the Octoberdemarcation
and mustremainhighon the historical
agendafortheperiod1917-29.
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II. THE NEW SOVIETHISTORY

history
ofsocialandcultural
themethods
havebrought
In recentyearshistorians
period.Theyhaveshown
to thepost-October
of discovery
and theexcitement
problems
newsourcesandtackling
in exploiting
energyandingenuity
fantastic
of howthe
andissuescentral
to whatshouldbecomea newsetof explanations
party/state
andthen
authoritarian
intoan extremely
SovietUniondevelopedfirst
globalpowerof today.The richnessof this
intothe troubled
butreforming
of Sovietsocial
mayyetallowus to viewtherealcontent
scholarship
historical
howthingsworkedin theirown
to better
understand
andpoliticalinstitutions,
andmadetheirwayin theworld.The works
howpeoplelived,suffered,
terms,
our
thatrefocus
andmovements
ofstructures
underreviewhereexplorea variety
andthe
theroleofculture,
understanding
of suchissuesas stateversussociety,
building
Herewe havea newwaveofscholars
andmeaning
ofStalinism.
origins
upon the worksof such pioneersas Moshe Lewin, LorenGraham,David
arestillvery
all ofthesepacesetters
(Fortunately,
andSheilaFitzpatrick.
Joravsky,
hereincludetwo
thefield.)The booksconsidered
muchengagedin redefining
period(1918-21),7 a study
Communism
workson theCivilWar/War
important
duringthe 1920s,8two worksthatdeal
of privatetradersand entrepreneurs
as a
withStalinandStalinism,9
andthreethatseekto explainStalinism
directly
of govemance
specificareasof social,
byexploring
andmanner
system
cultural
economic,and culturallife.10Finally,we havea detailedstudyof theStalin
thefirst
twoyears
during
inactionatthemoment
ofitsgreatest
challenge,
regime
ofdomestic
mobilization
aftertheGermaninvasionon June22, 1941.11
on thesocialandcultural
richarethestudiesnowbeingproduced
Particularly
and
itstwinprocesssocietybuilding,
dimensions
ofrevolutionary
statebuilding,
to
attention
theirimpacton politics.This new workis markedby scrupulous
published
(andin somecases archival)sourcesanda missionto look
untapped
labelsof "state,""society,"and"party,"reexamining
behindtheconventional
as
suchparadigms
LeninandStalin,andredefining
theroleoftheleaderfigures,
has
Stalinism.
Mostof post-1917Soviethistory
totalitarianism
and,especially,
beena seriesofblankpagesthatarejustnowbeingfilledin. Evenold questions
ofLeninism
andtheearlyyears
therelationship
ofLeninism,
suchas thenature
of Sovietpowerto theStalinregime,and thesocial and culturalcontentof
7 Isabel A. Tirado,YoungGuard! The Communist
YouthLeague of Petrograd,1917-1920
inPower:A StudyofMoscowduring
(New York,1988); andRichardSakwa,SovietCommunists
theCivil War,1918-21 (New York,1988).
8 Alan M. Ball, Russia's Last Capitalists:The Nepmen,1921-1929 (Berkeleyand Los
Angeles,1987).
9 MichalReiman,TheBirthofStalinism:The USSR on theEve ofthe "SecondRevolution"
Ind., 1987); and RobertMcNeal, Stalin:Man and Ruler(New York,1988).
(Bloomington,
Dreams:UtopianVisionandExperimental
10 RichardStites,Revolutionary
LifeintheRussian
and
Revolution(New York,1989); Douglas Weiner,Models ofNature:Ecology,Conservation
CulturalRevolutionin SovietRussia (Bloomington,
Ind., 1988); and Lewis H. Siegelbaum,
and thePoliticsofProductivity
Stakhanovism
(Cambridge,1988).
" Klaus Segbers,Die Sowjetunion
vonVerwaltung,
Die Mobilisierung
imZweitenWeltkrieg:
im "GrossenVaterldndischer;
undGesellschaft
Krieg,"1941-1943 (Munich,1987).
Wirtschaft
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Stalinism
whenexamined
thelensoffreshsources
provoke
newanswers
through
andtopics.StudiesofStalinandStalinism
havelongpassedbeyond
theimmediate
post-World
WarII totalitarian
schoolin whichsocialscientific
modelscoexisted
uneasily
withclassiclife-and-times
studies
ofthegreatleadersofthe
biographical
12 In themidrevolution.
1970sandearly1980sthreeimportant
bookstooka fresh
lookat"Stalinism"andcameupwitha variety
ofabstract
commentaries
onSoviet
history
duringtheStalinperiod.'3Important
modelswereputforth
portraying
Stalinism
as a "mono-organizational
fromabove."
society"or as "revolution
Seweryn
Bialerdefined
"mature
Stalinism"
as "massterror,"
"the
bysuchtraits
extinction
ofthepartyas a movement,"
"theshapelessness
ofthemacropolitical
organization,"
"theextreme
mobilizational
modelofeconomicgrowth,"
"a heterogeneous
valuesystem
whichfavored
economicstatusandpowerstratification,
fostered
cultural
andwastiedtoextreme
extraordinary
conformity,
nationalism,"
"theendoftherevolutionary
impulseto changesocietyandthepersistence
ofa
conservative
statusquo attitude
toward
and"thesystem
of
existing
institutions,"
personal
as a symbol
ofgeneral
dictatorship
useofpower.'14 Theproblem
arbitrary
withsucha finely
honedlistis thatitfailstodistinguish
between
Stalintheperson
andStalinism
as a governing
ThismodelseemstofitanyperiodofSoviet
system.
history
(at leastthrough
theBrezhnev
regime).It comesremarkably
closeto the
15
classiccharacteristics
of totalitarianism.
Anynew understanding
of the Stalinregimewill requirea largedose of
of thewriting
discovery,
of history
frombelow,andof theunusualpatterns
of
mutualinfluence
of "state" and "society."New work-sometimes
called
revisionist-onthepurgesand collectivization,
forexample,has begunto lay
thesefoundations-and,
despiteloud protests
aboutthemoralinsensitivity
of
discussing
socialsupport
forStalinism,
describing
thepurgesofthe1930sas not
entirely
plannedor centralized,
and promulgating
a visionof Stalinism
as the
"stateagainstitself,"thehistoriography
is growing
bolderandis maturing.
Ideas
onceregarded
in somequarters
as revisionist
(andnotwithout
suspicion
oreven
outright
hostility)-for
example,thatthecenterwas notalwaysin control
ofthe
12
For a reviewof therole of thetotalitarian
modeland its critics,see StephenF. Cohen,
"ScholarlyMissions: Sovietologyas a Vocation,"in his Rethinking
the SovietExperience:
Politicsand Historysince1917 (New York,1985), pp. 3-37. RecentlyJerry
Hough,an astute
criticof the limitations
of the totalitarian
model, has raised it again as a valid model for
boththeLeninand Stalinregimesand forcomparisons
understanding
of theSovietUnionwith
Nazi Germany(see Russia and the West:Gorbachevand thePoliticsof Reform[New York,
1988]). Fora thoughtful
statement
on thecultural
andhistorical
originsandroleofthetotalitarian
model,see AbbottGleason, "'Totalitarianism'
in 1984," RussianReview43 (1984): 145-59.
Gleason arguesthatany conceptthatcould have caughtthe attention
of so manyintelligent
observersmusthavesomevalidity.
13 RobertC. Tucker,ed., Stalinism:
Essays in HistoricalInterpretation
(New York,1977);
Sheila Fitzpatrick,
ed., CulturalRevolution
in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington,
hId., 1978);
and SewerynBialer,Stalin'sSuccessors:Leadership,Stability
and Changein theSovietUnion
(Cambridge,1980).
14 Bialer,p. 10.
15
Thisis HenryReichman'sargument
in hisarticle"Reconsidering
'Stalinism',"Theoryand
Society17 (1988): 57-89.
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thatcentral
stateauthorities
oftenhada dimvisionoftheirgoalsand
periphery;
one of howto arriveat them;thatStalin'spoliciesgenerated
an evendimmer
thatpoliticsdidexistunderStalin;that
andpopularsupport;
enthusiasm
genuine
cultural
socialgroupscoulddo thepoliceworkofthestate;andthatconservative
theworkof
in socialreality-arenow informing
normshad somefoundation
thenewly
aremining
andperseverence
whowithpatience
manyseriousscholars,
oftheSovietUnion.In the
libraries
morehospitable
andrecently
openedarchives
suchviewsarenotmeantto absolveStalin
worksofmany"Soviet" historians,
in thehorrors
of theStalinyears.All this
or the"center"of moralculpability
arepossible.
breakthroughs
impliesthatfurther
in Moscow
RichardSakwa exploresthe originsof Bolshevikgovernment
is theorigins
theeraofWarCommunism
andtheCivilWar.Thequestion
during
a biting
duringthisperiod,andSakwasetsforth
of Bolshevikauthoritarianism
a productof
to show thatauthoritarian
was primarily
government
argument
the
offighting
a response
totherequirements
Bolshevik
ideologyandnotsimply
wholiketo
historians
CivilWar.Sakwasetsoutto attackSovietand Western
1917-April1918,
months
ofrulebyLenin'sparty,
November
theearliest
portray
ofthenonauthoritarian
NewEconomicPolicy
andas anearlyversion
as moderate
claimsofWarCommunism-a
bythealmostfanatical
(NEP) thatwasinterrupted
Leninism.Sakwa
set of policiesnotto be equatedwiththoseof mainstream
pursuesideologyas thechiefcauseof Bolshevikexcessduringthe
relentlessly
continuities
andpost-1917
ofRussianbackwardness
CivilWar.He rejectsnotions
insteadto
preferring
and politicalculture,
withtheOld Regimein institutions
level
theprevious
as a sharpbreakwiththepast:"Whatever
viewtherevolution
notonlytheold
theBolshevik
ofcivilsociety,
regimedestroyed
ofdevelopment
ofcivilsocietyas ithaddevelopednotonlyas
butalso thefeatures
statesystem
and
partof the bourgeoissystembut also withinthe workers'movement
within
theBolshevik
partyitself.'"16
ultimately
thatencomThe "fusionof politicsand ideology"becomestheframework
of municipal,
abouttheemergence
material
state,and
passesmuchimportant
about
in Moscowduring1918-21. This powerful
argument
partyinstitutions
of not
of theimportance
us of theneedfor"totalhistory,"
ideologyreminds
therealmof ideasfromeitherpoliticsor society.One can
compartmentalizing
about
Lenin's "What Is to Be Done?" withits bold assertions
deconstruct
therhetoric
to a fundamental
and see through
and spontaneity,
consciousness
firm
andpower.Butthiskindofanalysisrequires
obsessionwithcontrol
cultural
norms.HereSakwa
linkswithsocialgroups,theactorsorbearersofthecultural
rejectsthe
fallsshort.His visionof ideologyis fartooliteral,andhe explicitly
Thisis most
haveanyroleat all in hisstory.
thatsocialforcesmight
possibility
notan exercisein theNewCultural
History.
certainly
in
LeninandStalin,especially
between
ForSakwathereis a directconnection
institutions
spawnedby Bolshevikideology.Stateand party
theauthoritarian
andgrassrootsimpulsesmomenbureaucracies
quicklynegatedthedemocratic
16

Sakwa (n. 7 above), p. 14.
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(p.
in sovietsand other"genuinemasspopularorganizations"
tarilynurtured
273). He arguesthat"in a sense the Bolshevikprojectwas a thoroughly
must
andhencetheideaofa laterdegeneration
thefirst,
onefrom
bureaucratized
fromthe
and itscommittees
The partyorganisation
withskepticism.
be treated
and
all intermediary
between
themselves
ordestroyed
aggregations
absorbed
first
of Moscowinstitution
research
in theintricacies
society."Forall his important
buildingand politicsduringtheCivilWarperiod,Sakwaretumsto traditional
of
builtupontheradicalseparation
ofBolshevik
authoritarianism
interpretations
stateandsociety.
the
ofTirado'sviewthatitwastheCivilWarthatproduced
Thisis theopposite
and vitalyouth
thatchangedwhatshe sees as an independent
authoritarianism
of
Thebeauty
oftheKomsomol.
intothehierarchical
partyinstrument
movement
on youth.It looksat a vitaland,indeed,
itsemphasis
Tirado'sbookis precisely
away
socialgroupthatcutsacrossclasslinesandmovesthediscussion
powerful
to viewtherevolution
in termsof
entirely
tendency
fromtheall too frequent
aretransformed
bythe
orpeasants.It also showshowsocialmovements
workers
as in so manyotherspheres(e.g.,
andhowin theyouthmovement,
revolution
wasbuilt
outcome
andeconomic
policy,tonamejusttwo),theBolshevik
cultural
roles
thathadstakedoutpotent
radicalyouth
organizations
left-wing,
uponearlier
of nonclasssocial
ofthepartyduring1917-18. The attractiveness
independent
however.
During
youthwas limited,
andpoliticalorganizations
to working-class
quickly
as theSocialistLeagueofYoungWorkers
organizations
1917,suchyouth
workers.
workers
thanfactory
and white-collar
morestudents
beganto attract
"spontaneous"socialforcethat
intoyetanother
Still,Russianyouthorganized
of "the
organization
beganeven in 1917 to evolve intoa morestructured
andtherevolution
withtheBolsheviks
committed."
Vaguesympathies
politically
of support,
a changeof nameto theCommunist
concreteprograms
generated
ofcourse),andeventually
elitism,
YouthLeague(dominated
bypartymembers,
andbureaucratic
control.
exclusivity,
of theSovietstatethatprobesmoredeeplyits
We stillneeda newrendering
by
or uplifted
cultural
and socialrootsto discoverhowsocialforcesunleashed
is
ofthestate.WhatSakwadoesshow,however,
infused
thestructures
revolution
during
thisformative
thatsurrounded
institution
building
theremarkable
conflict
periodof Soviet history.Conflicttook place both amongand withinthe
Komsomoland thepartyand tradeunions,forexample,withtheforcesof
"reform"
and"democracy"
as losersby 1921.Itwasas ifpoliticshad
emerging
rivalgroups
bureaucratic
politythatpitted
becomefirmly
rootedina corporative,
Withthe
of nonworkers
workerallies) againstone another.
(withor without
gone,class politicswereno longerappropriate;
(and thenobility)
bourgeoisie
It would
problematic.17
itselfwouldbecomeincreasingly
indeed,class identity
17 See the discussion
of LeopoldH. Haimson,"The Problemof Social Identitiesin Early
Russia," pp. 3-20; WilliamG. Rosenberg,"Identities,Powerand Social
Twentieth-Century
State
Interaction
inRevolutionary
Russia,"pp. 21-28; andAlfredJ.Rieber,"Landed Property,
andCivil War,"pp. 29-38-all in SlavicReview,vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring1988); and
Authority,
thediscussionof SheilaFitzpatrick,
"The Bolsheviks'Dilemma:Class, Culture,and Politicsin
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notbe toofarfetched
to say thatsomeof theenergiesof class conflict
became
absorbed
inthecorporate
struggles
within
thepartyandstateinstitutions
thathad
co-optedtheinfrastructure
of theintelligentsia,
thelowermiddlestrata,
andthe
working
class.'8
MichalReimanandAlanM. Ball breaknewgroundin theirstudiesof NEP
societyand politics.'9Reiman'sbook caused a stirwhenfirstpublishedin
in 1979.Itis basedonhitherto
Germany
unexploited
copiesofSovietdocuments
(keyStatePoliticalDirectorate
[GPU] [politicalpolice and forerunner
of the
Committee
forStateSecurity
(KGB)] reports
andcorrespondence,
e.g.) foundin
thearchive
oftheGerman
to
foreign
ministry.
Thesedocuments
permit
theauthor
of theStalin-dominated
tracethestep-by-step
reaction
partyleadership
to what
Reimansees as a deepening
socialcrisisat theend of NEP. Reimanwantsto
ofStalinism,
document
thebirth
bywhichhemeanstheregime'spoliticalchoice
to respondto a largelyself-generated
He
crisiswitha program
of socialterror.
shedsnewlighton theroleoftheGPU in thelate1920sandparticularly
on the
roleof its leader,V. Menzhinsky,
as a key supporter
of theemerging
Stalin
coalition.
Menzhinsky
wasa majorplayerindebatesovereconomic
policyandits
relationship
to diplomacy.In 1928 he garneredsupportforexpandedGPU
coercivepowersto extricate
theSovietUnionfroma life-threatening
economic
crisis.Theworking
classin 1928was suffering
itsowncrisis-a combination
of
anda crisisofidentity
thatpitted
severehardship
generations
againsteachother.
and specialists
Fora time,theGPU steppedin to support
in orderto
managers
alive.Reimantellsa compelling
keepindustrial
enterprises
storythatbringsout
theconnections
betweenforeign
andtradepolicyandtheregime'smanipulation
a moodthat
offoreign
encirclement
andinternal
ofthethreat
opposition,
fostering
ForReiman,the"Stalinleap
cameto holdtheregimeitselfas prisoner.
rapidly
had nothing
forward"at the end of the twenties
to do withsocialism,and
theentireStalinexperience
shouldnotbe citedas proofofMarxism's
therefore
Reimanmaintains
thattheessenceof
failurein thetwentieth
century.
Further,
ofpurposefully
was itssocialdimension,
thecombination
Stalinism
unmanaged
cutofffrom
ofa stratum
ofbureaucrats
themasses.Here
crisisandtheemergence
whomhe labelsan apologist
foran
he firmly
rejectstheviewofRoyMedvedev,
or thetruesocialismthatwas distorted
idealizedLeninism,
by theevil Stalin.
ofdocuments
and
remain
ofReiman'shandful
aboutthereliability
Still,questions
therein.
Thebook
thatshouldbe giventotheviewsexpressed
therelative
weight
socialprocessof industrialis weakestwhenit triesto connectthemomentous
izationin thelate 1920sto therealmofhighpolitics.
thenatureof NEP society,and theproblemof
Questionsof class identity,
cometo theforein AlanBall's studyoftheNepmen(andwomen).
alternatives
theEarlySovietYears,"pp. 599-613; RonaldGrigorSuny,"Class andStateintheEarlySoviet
"Social Historyand
Period:A Replyto SheilaFitzpatrick,"
pp. 614-19; and Daniel Orlovsky,
Its Categories,"pp. 620-23; and Fitzpatrick's
reply(pp. 624-26)-all in Slavic Review,vol.
47, no. 4 (Winter1988).
"Soviet
18 Thiscomesclose to the"stateagainstitself"formulation
ofGaborT. Ritterspom,
Politicsin the 1930's: Rehabilitating
Society,"Studiesin ComparativeCommunism
19, no. 2
(1986): 105-28, and "Rethinking
Stalinism,"RussianHistory11, no. 4 (1984): 343-61.
19 Ball (n. 8 above); and Reiman(n. 9 above).
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fromtheoppression
oftheclasswar
Whowerethesepeople,suddenly
liberated
to produce,buy,sell, employ,and otherwise
tryto puttheirstampuponthe
to stayafloatagainst
socialistsociety?
Weretheyonlysurvivors,
emerging
trying
impossible
odds,ordidtheyhavelargerdesignsuponthesocialistpolity?What
and wellwas theirfunction?
Ball providestheanswersin a well-researched
craftedstudyof the groupof 500,000 or so individuals
who manufactured,
of the1920s.Thisis fresh
andtradedin thequasi-markets
managed,bartered,
womenandformer
material.
Welearnthatunemployed
merchants,
shopemployweremostactivein theseneweconomicactivities.
ees, andartisans
we
Further,
theirefforts
atlargeandevenfor
seejusthowimportant
wereforthepopulation
thestateorsocialistsector.TheNepmensuppliedmuchtothestateandprovided
thegoodsandservicesthattheunproductive
stateandcooperative
sectorscould
not offer-andthis was partof the enormousresentment,
class envyand
and marginality
thatfestered
animosity,
the 1920s in
insecurity,
throughout
relationto NEP and thosewho madeit work.Ball's workis outstanding
in
andsociallegitimacy
thelackof security,
institutional
documenting
guarantees,
therapidity
thatafflicted
theNepmen.Fromthisperspective,
andviolencewith
whichtheyweredispatched
in thereheated
class warof thelate 1920swas a
perfectly
logicaloutcome.
Thesocialandcultural
dimensions
oftheRussianRevolution
andthenature
of
theStalinregime-whatwe havecometo call "Stalinism"-is thesubjectof
threeexciting
andoriginal
booksbyStites,Weiner,
andSiegelbaum.
Eachauthor
addresses
theissueof politicsthrough
thelensesof societyandculture.
Stites's
Dreamsis a movingandpassionate
Revolutionary
studyoftheutopianimpulses
thatfueledtherevolutionary
andafter1917andtheirfateduring
processduring
the1920sandearly1930s.ForStites,utopianism,
defined
as "socialandcultural
anddrastic
experimentation,
self-conscious
andconcrete,"
innovation-symbolic
is centralto all "major social revolutions
of modemtimes."20This living
in thearts,popularculture,
experimentalism
religion,life-styles,
architecture,
theorganization
of laborand management,
mythmaking,
and thelike was a
motiveforceintheRussianRevolution
particularly
strong
as "botha product
of
therevolutionary
upheavalanda partofitsforceandemotional
content."
Stites
locatestherootsofrevolutionary
utopianism
inthereligious
andpopularutopias
ofOldRegimeRussia,andhebrilliantly
howthewaywaspavedfor
demonstrates
Stalin'sownpowerful
counterutopia
bya deeplyrootedRussianstatetradition
of
"administrative
utopia"with"its peculiarblendof symmetry,
bruteforce,and
benevolence.'"21
Stiteswritesmovingly
abouttheentirerangeofexperiments
in
the post-October
period,rangingfromiconoclasmand festivalsto the godofLunacharsky
andBogdanov.Thelatter
building
heldtheviewthattheessence
of religion,its spiritual
humanbond,could be attainedwithout
God. They
evenbefore1917,a worldof dreams,myths,
foresaw,
sounds,andritualsthat
wouldelevatehumanity
to divinestatusandbringaboutcollective
immortality.
Stitesoffers
a superbanalysisof EmilianYaroslavsky's
Leagueof theMilitant
Godlesswithitsrelatively
noncoercive
agitational
approach
ofconverting
people
20
21

Stites(n. 10 above), p. 3.
Ibid., p. 252.
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totheviewthatsciencewas adequatetoexplainall phenomena.
His descriptions
oftherituals
ofbirth,
marriage,
anddeatharepriceless
entrees
intotheenergized
worldofsocialrevolution.
WelearnofOctoberings
(therevolutionary
equivalent
ofbaptisms)
withchildren
receiving
suchnamesas Traktorina,
Tekstil,
Robesper,
Marks,Engelina,Barrikada,
andthelike.Thereis thetouching
story
ofthefirst
recorded
in Kharkovin 1923withitsgiftsof portraits
Octobering
of theinfant
Lenin,solemnparental
promisesto raisetheirchildin thespiritof MarxismLeninism,
andsinging
oftheInternationale
alongwithfolksongs.Stitesis careful
notto confusethepeasants'"fantastic
abilityto absorbnewfaithsandrituals"
withclaimsthatbolshevism
actuallyconstituted
a religion.In thishe follows
MauriceHindus,who called it a "nonfaithbecause it was not forgiving,
possessedno deity,exaltedscienceandnature,andpossesseda 'revolutionary'
ofethicsinstead
system
ofa humane
one.Itlackedbeauty,
dignity
andspirit";the
whoemphasized
itslackof "inwarddramaanddepth,its
philosopher
Berdyaev,
weakness
inreligious
anditspedantry";
psychology,
andMao Zedong,whosaid
simply,
"Marxism-Leninism
has no beauty,
norhas it anymystical
value.It is
onlyextremely
useful."22
ForStites,Stalinism
is thecentraltrope,thehistorical
realitythatstandsin
oppositionto the creative,life-promoting,
energeticnatureof the pre-1929
communist
society.For Stites,this revolutionary,
was
proletarian
morality
"modern,fullspirited,
andhealthy."
humane,rational
Stalinism
the
represents
of therevolution."23
of 1928-31
"deutopianizing
The "culturalrevolution"
markedtheturning
showsin semiotictermshow the
point.Stitesbrilliantly
Stalinist
revolution
anddestroyed
theearlier
the
co-opted
utopianism
byreplacing
of theearlyrevolution
communalism
witha "directed,
eclectic,spontaneous
versionforthesakeof a collective
imposed,monolithic
goaldefined
byleaders
andthedeified'I."' ForStites,Stalinism
is a "whollyappropriate
nameforthe
of (1) theever-present
new politicalculturebornin the 1930's," consisting
inbolshevism;
authoritarian
elements
zealgenerated
and
tocontrol
(2) themilitary
thetransformation
orchestrate
andindustrialization);
(collectivization
(3) Stalin's
Russianstatebureaucratic
and(5)
personal
despotism;
(4) thepersistent
heritage;
thesocialauthoritarianism
of theRussianpeoplethemselves.24
Stalin'srevolufrom
thatofthetsarsinitsdynamism
andinitsability,
tionary
utopiawasdifferent
thenatural
offantasy
that
elements
generated
byStalin'spersonal
role,tomagnify
as father,
mustaccompany
all radicalchange.Stalin'sself-image
ruler,elderof
thesocialandcultural
thecollective
resonated
widelythroughout
field,andStites
his materialconcerning
theastonishingly
is particularly
sharpin marshalling
theabstract
vesselof
Stalincultofthe1930s.Stitessucceedsin filling
powerful
withsocialandcultural
in usingthetermhe runsthe
Stalinism
content,
though
inLenin'sbasicdichotomy
riskofignoring
therootsoftheStalinist
counterutopia
in theintricate
in "WhatIs to Be Done?"-consciousness/spontaneity-and
ofthepartyandthestatefrom1917to 1928.Of course,Stites'sthemes
history
Ibid., p. 122.
Ibid., pp. 226-27.
24 Ibid., p. 243.
22
23
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ofthe1920s.Onemustweigh1920sutopianism
mustbe placedinthefullcontext
againstthe depthof the pluralismof the 1920s and ask how important
with"graphsoflife"
andplansformegacities,
conductorless
orchestras
complete
lifeand architectural
to join dailycommunal
werein
thatattempted
planning,
socialmovements
to suchpowerful
issuesas statebuilding,
relation
(formation
and reformation
of social and occupationalgroups,includingworkersand
andthe
of a newSovietintelligentsia,
theemergence
bureaucrats),
agriculture,
ofdissent.
party'sownintolerance
is his analysisof thecultof the
contributions
One of Stites'smostimportant
to spread
launchedby Gastevand Kerzhentsev
machineand of organizations
visionsofa self-regulating,
technocratic
Taylorist
societyamongthestilllargely
Thestories
andmanagers.
andrelatively
Sovietworkers
agrarian
unsophisticated
his Central
of Labor (NOT) movement,
of Gastev'sScientific
Organization
ofLabor(1920-38), andKerzhentsev's
Institute
LeagueofTime(theattempt
to
fromthefactories
moveTaylorism
to all spheresofeveryday
life)offer
insights
in theUSSR. Theyprovideexamplesofthefacility
with
intotoday'sdilemmas
whichconservative
can be builtuponliberationist
foundations.25
counterutopias
of the
DouglasWeiner'sstudyof theecologyand conservation
movements
1920s fitsratherneatlyintoa similarframework.
Once again,a flourishing
culturalmovement
prerevolutionary
(thistimein thescientific
realm)is even
further
liberatedby the revolution
and assumesa vibrantplace in the still
pluralistic
scientific
of the1920s.The lifesciencesbecamea major
community
ideological
battleground
during
thecultural
revolution.
Particularly
disturbing
to
certainBolsheviks
andtheirminions
in thescientific
was thenotion
community
thatall peoplewerenotbiologically
andthathumannature,
identical
"whatever
itmight
be," was a roadblock
totheegalitarianism
andcollectivism
espousedby
themorerabidproponents
of "thegreatchange."
TheStalinists
rejected
theory
(in theformofbourgeois
science)andpromoted
miracles:vernalization,
acclimatization,
and the attendant
social miracleof
collectivization
ofagriculture,
whichweretobe produced
orassistedbya purely
utilitarian
science.The searchformiraclestook place behindthe maskof
revolutionary
utilitarianism
and practicality.
According
to Weiner,
theStalinist
view(espousedby littleStalin-scientists)
was "not willingto acceptBiology's
limitedabilityto know,predictand controleventsand unableto live withthe
limitations
ofactingina statistically
probabalistic
middleground."26
Nature
was
meantto be transformed,
and theecologicalview thatpromoted
thehealthy
ofnatural
functioning
was deemednotusefulenough-indeed,
systems
itwas a
pointof viewthatcouldonlybe espousedbytheclassenemy.
Theattackon sciencebecamepartofthelargerattackon NEP.Weiner
argues
convincingly
thatthenewStalinist
scienceviolatedthecommitment
of earlier
25
For anotherfirst-rate
examination
of theissue of revolution
and culture,see Zenovia A.
Sochor,Revolution
and Culture:TheBogdanov-Lenin
Controversy
(Ithaca,N.Y., 1988);andthe
more recentbook by Lynn Mally, Cultureof the Future: The ProleticultMovementin
Revolutionary
Russia (Berkeleyand Los Angeles, 1990); Mark Von Hagen, Soldiersin the
ProletarianDictatorship
(Ithaca,N.Y., 1990).
26
Weiner(n. 10 above), p. 130.
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aboutthe
ofnature
to"drawconclusions
tousethestudy
radicalRussianscientists
wanteda science
revolutionists
largersocialandpoliticalworld."The cultural
socialandpolitical
Thelarger
totechnology."
limited
totheroleof" handmaiden
materialism.
ofMarxistdialectical
wereto be leftto themetascience
questions
The Lysenkosand Prezents(leadingfiguresin the new Stalinistscientific
ofthe
version
as didyetanother
flourished
insuchan atmosphere,
establishment)
empire
stateagainstitself.Weinertellsa highlyoriginaltale of institutional
theOctoberRev tion.Thevarious
warsthatbegansoonafter
building
andturf
educational
including
andresources,
networks
extensive
commissariats
controlled
thatwereso
(zapovedniki)
reserves
institutions
andeventhenature
andresearch
theroleofprofessional
Weiner
documents
totheconservation
movement.
central
Stalinist
pressinpromoting
andoftheprofessional
andcongresses
organizations
frombelow, or perhaps
science.This was anotherexampleof revolution
rod of proletarian
Dialecticsbecamethemeasuring
fromwithin.27
revolution
"mechanists"whoconsidered
Eventhemoderate
truth.
morality
and scientific
butone thatshouldnotbe
worldview,
dialectics
a properguidingphilosophical
capable of
consciouslyimposedon an empiricalsciencethatwas entirely
werebeatenby theDeborinites,
of nature,
ascertaining
thedialecticalstructure
ofthe"bourgeoisprofessoriate."28
favorites
whosawthemas theantidialectical
fields,notto
of entirescientific
The doorwas nowopento thecondemnation
of talented
Naturetoo was a victim,as can be
individuals.
generations
mention
in theSovietUnion.The growing
day ecologicaldisasters
seen frompresent
intheSovietUniontodayowesmuchtothevision,courage,
ecologicalmovement
of itsearlySovietpredecessors.
methods
andsoundscientific
of thebasicsocialand
Stalinism
requiresa deeperunderstanding
Rethinking
politicalprocessesof the entireSovietperiod.Lewis Siegelbaumtakesthe
intotheindustrialization
revolution
processofthe
beyondthecultural
exploration
thatstunning
mythof massmobilization
1930s.His subjectis Stakhanovism,
ofAugust30-31, 1935
whoonthenight
AlekseiStakhanov,
namedfortheminer
examplewas
timeshisquota.29Stakhanov's
hewed102tonsofcoal,orfourteen
workers
andmanagers
alike,and
takenupbyauthorities
eagertomotivate
quickly
ofthosewhoexceededtheirnorms
inthissensethemassmovement
theyforged
to
attempts
maybe seen as one morein a longseriesof largelyunsuccessful
Herewe aredrawnintothesinewsofSovietsociety
during
overcome
themarket.
theStalinyears-thefactory
workplacewithits nexusof laborers,foremen,
workers
in the
theplaceof Stakhanovite
andmanagement;
technical
personnel,
of
ofthemovement;
andtherelationship
implications
largersociety;thecultural
central
thesurprisingly
partyandstateorgansto thesesocialgroups
fragmented
and
the maneuvering
This is the "politicsof productivity,"
and institutions.
27 For a particularly
of the
good discussionof the issue of the sourcesof self-censorship,
to createa Stalinistlinefrombelow,thatis, to
groupsof intelligentsia
capacityof professional
thinkand act in Stalinistterms,see Leonid Heller,"Restructuring
LiteraryMemoryin the
USSR," Survey30, no. 4 (June1989): 44-65.
28 Weiner,
p. 126.
29
Siegelbaum(n. 10 above), p. 2.
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driveof the 1930sin which
thatinfusedtheindustrialization
accommodation
the "state." Stateand societybecome
"society"succeededin contaminating
at all levels,fromtheworkplace
manifested
up
entities
interpenetrating
mutually
that
forSiegelbaum
is "an amalgam
ofpractices
Stalinism
theministries.
through
to appropriation
on and weresubjected
by different
groupsand
bothimpinged
"30
institutions.

moveof theStakhanovite
interpretations
rejectsearlierWestern
Siegelbaum
rationalization
ofthe
positive
ment.Theseincludetheviewthatitwasa generally
andlazinessoftheaverageRussian
bytheinefficiency
madenecessary
workplace
the"lack ofproportionality
among
viewthatitexacerbated
thenegative
worker;
of theentire
theplanlessness
andsectors,thusintensifying
different
enterprises
inproduction,
theincreases
in seriousdisruptions
%;31andthatitresulted
system'
in factbeingtheresultof "thorof Stakhanovites
ascribedto theproductivity
in thetechnical
modernization
of plantthatbrought
improvements
oughgoing
had
A corollary
to thisviewis thatStakhanovism
ofproduction."32
organization
casteofindustrial
tocreatea privileged
function:
itallowedtheregime
a political
the
represented
viewthatStakhanovism
workers.
Thiscomescloseto Trotsky's
to undermine
apotheosisof piece ratesand thatit was a plannedattempt
of a laboraristocracy.
solidarity
bythecreation
working-class
of theStalinregime,
In an argument
thatshedsmuchlighton theworkings
was not a strategy
developedby a
Siegelbaumshows thatStakhanovism
Norwas it
thathad a clearidea of whatit wantedto accomplish.
government
control
and
tolong-standing
directed
Itwasan ad hocresponse
solelyatworkers.
by rapid
problemsin theworkplacethathad been compounded
motivational
(in terms
ofsocialclass
composition
industrialization
andtheconstantly
shifting
The factthatthe
andlevelsof skillandeducation)
of laborandmanagement.33
in its
hostility
supportand outright
statehad waveredbetweenconditional
and informal
a politicsof protection
to bothgroupsreinforced
relationships
The
thattendedtopreserve
autonomy
forlocalinterests.
considerable
patronage
and shock
extended
backto thesocialistcompetition
lineageof Stakhanovism
of newcadresof
theenergyandambition
workof the1920s,whichexpressed
skilledworkers,
toward
theendofthatdecade.Butthesemobilizations
especially
of falsecampaigns
andthecreation
wentnowhere
becauseof bureaucratization
and production
resultsthrough
the collusionof the tradeunions,enterprise
and partycells, who all feltthe pressureof highernorms.
management,
was freetoreward
anditoftenrewarded
thelaboritfoundworthy,
Management
the
thereby
deflating
or simplymadeeveryone
a shockworker,
thebootlickers
concept.
30

Ibid., p. 6.
This was the view of the Mensheviklabor activistSolomon Schwarz, writingin
Sotsialisticheskii
quotedin ibid.,p. 4.
vestnik,
32
The
The argument
of Donald Filtzerin SovietWorkersand StalinistIndustrialization:
FormationofModernSovietProduction
Relations(Arnonk,N.Y., 1986).
33 Siegelbaum'sbookshouldbe readalongwiththesuperbworkof HiroakiKuromiya
on the
politicaland social dimensionsof Stalin's industrialdrive, 1928-32 (Kuromiya,Stalin's
Industrial
Revolution:
1928-1932 [Cambridge,1988]).
Politicsand Workers,
31
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Siegelbaum'slivelystoryunmasksthedeed itself,Stakhanov'sapparently
heroicfeat.The factis thatStakhanov'sachievement
was something
of a
Potemkin
village.He did notworkalone,as was impliedin initialreports
and
laterpropaganda.
His hewingofcoal depended
on theteamwork
ofseveralother
andsupervisors,
workers
andindeedtheentireperformance
was stage-managed
fromtheoutsetto gainoptimalresults.In no waycouldhisaccomplishment
be
even by the mostzealous workersfunctioning
reproduced,
in the normal
workplace.What,then,did the statesupporters
of thisstunthave in mind?
has discerned
fourmotives:(1) to createa massmovement;
Siegelbaum
(2) to
overcomechronicstoppagesin production
flow(perceivedas the resultof
on theshopfloorandinadequately
informal
conditions
trained
personnel);
(3) to
testthecommitment
ofproduction
specialists
(technical
personnel
andmanagers);
and(4) toassaultexisting
shopfloor
practices
byturning
theunusualStakhanovite
moment
intothenorm.
Whatdidthefreshly
minted
Stakhanovite
workers
gain?Forthemostfortunate
intovariouslowerlevel
(andthesewerea distinct
minority)
there
werepromotions
anda bevyof consumer
managerial
positions
goods,all providing
gristforthe
milland imagesof workers
propaganda
livingthemiddle-class
dream.Forthe
of fellowworkers(and managers)and the
rest,therewas the resentment
dreamsof material
on by a troubled
unrealized
gainsbrought
economyandthe
onsetof war.The sorryfactis thatStakhanovism
did notbeginto addressthe
structural
or any otherlargeissue in Soviet
problemsof laborproductivity
It was a classiclessonin theweaknessof themobilizational
modeof
industry.
themarket,
a lessonthatunfortunately
has notbeenlearnedto the
overcoming
present
day.
Allofthesevolumespointtoward
a morecomplete
oftheStalin
understanding
in thatthey
era andof thedictator's
personalrole.Theyrevisetherevisionists
for
arguethatthecenter(Stalinorhisgoverning
bloc)hada largeresponsibility
the mostextremedomesticpoliciesof culturalrevolution,
industrialization,
and thepurges.This is trueevenif thecenter'spolicieswere
collectivization,
or furthered
of society.Theseworksrejectthe
unplanned
by a largesegment
ofa diffuse
notion
andcausality
thatportrays
Stalinas onlya distant
responsibility
an executive
In
boardoras a mediator
ofrivalgroupsorfactions.
figure
chairing
thesestudiesStalin'sroleis integrated
intoitsvariouscontexts.
Onecomesaway
forceortheessenceofSoviethistory
is certainly
thatthedriving
realizing
larger
andculture
andlocalpolitics
alsomattered,
butthat
thanStalinalone,thatsociety
to a purelysocialor administrative
that
one can'treduceStalinism
phenomenon
orthecenter
fromtheperiphery.
Stalin
sealsoffpoliticsfromculture
artificially
was far morethan"chairmanof the board," someonewho mediatedand
ofinstitutional
andpolitburo
His rolewasmore
a variety
harmonized
viewpoints.
andinfluential.
He setthetone,fixedand sentthesignals,blatant
and
forceful
subtle,whichin thepoliticalcultureof theperiodwerereadilypickedup by
Yet
of smalleror would-beStalinsin thepartyand stateapparatus.
thousands
werefragmented,
andsuchhistorical
as Stakhapoliticalinstitutions
phenomena
novismandperhapseventhepurgesdevelopedwitha logicthatwas notfully
determined
byStalin'sdirectintervention.
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Amongthelegaciesof the 1930s was a docile,traumatized,
and insecure
anda newcadreof managers
whoseuncertainties
population
(andworkers)
and
anxieties
werea wayoflifedespitetheirempowennent
within
thebureaucratized
structures
ofheavyindustry.
Thisbureaucratic
andthelargersocietywere
system
ina macabre
fashion
wellprepared
forthenewwaveoftotalmobilizations
called
forth
by theNazi invasionin 1941. This is a majorthemein Klaus Segbers's
important
studyofwartime
economicadministration.
Segbersrevealsinmassive
detailtheinstitutional,
of themobilization
social,and politicaldimensions
of
Sovietheavyindustry,
andsocietyfortheunparalleled
transport,
conflict
against
Nazi Germany.
The recordwas impressive,
notas impressive
as official
though
Sovietmythmakers
wouldhave us believe.The positiveresultsof wartime
mobilization
weredue neither
to thegeniusof Stalin/Party/People
(theofficial
line)norto theaccomplishments
of thecentrally
plannedeconomy(Vosnesensky'sanalysis).Rather,
thesuccessesresulted
fromtheflexibility
andingenuity
withwhichtheapparently
bloatedand rigidlycentralized
of the
bureaucracy
thirties
gave way to new institutions,
methodsof mobilization,
and informal
patterns
of operationthatmade the economyfunction.
Stalin,accordingto
Segbers,was a veryimportant
figure
in all this,but"no moreandno less" (p.
298). A largegroupof industrial
administrators
and planners
as well as other
high-ranking
government
and partyofficialshad enormousinfluence
on the
successful
effort.
Thewarthusrepresented
a kindofliberation,
a headytimeof
extremechallengeand looseningof the moststifling
restraints
withinthe
economicand administrative
mechanisms.
Segbersis especiallygood on unintended
consequences.
Concerning
thelaborforce,forexample,he showsthatthe
influx
intofactories
ofmassivenumbers
ofwomenandpeasants
easedtheprocess
ofbreaking
up olderworkplace
patterns
(remember
Stakhanovism)
andintroducingmoreefficient
production
technologies.
It is heartening
to think
that"spontaneous"
forcesoflocalormidlevel
social
andbureaucratic
didindeedexistafter
initiative
thehorrors
ofthe1930sandthat
theymightexisteventoday.But therewerefailures,
too. Segbersshowsthat
despitetherelocation
of somefifteen
hundred
factories
fromthefront-line
war
zonesto theUralsand beyond,manymorethousands
of factories
and people
failedto surviveevacuationefforts.
Segbersmakesa majorcontribution
by
carefully
defining
theinnovations
in wartime
administration
andbalancing
them
againstthe inheritance
of war communism
and latermodes of economic
administration.
He concludesthatthecreative
improvisations
of 1941-44 were
theapogeeofpriorpractice.
Theirlegacywasmixed,however.
Newgeographical
areasof theSovietUnionandindustries
wereopenedto development
afterthe
war,buttherelatively
decentralized
and flexibleinstitutions
of thewaryears
quickly
gavewaytoanossified
administrative
command
structure
thatdragged
the
economyintoitspresent
morass.Segbers'sbookreminds
us of theveryhigh
ofGerman
quality
contributions
tolateImperial
RussianandSoviethistory,
a fact
all toooftenignored
amongEnglish-speaking
academics.
Despitethesepathbreaking
works,thefieldcriesoutforsynthesis
as wellas
newresearch,
forharmonizing
therolesoftheleadingactors(notjustStalin)and
socialmovements,
politicsandsociety,
ideasandaction,andso on. We needa
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and manymorestudiesof thepoliticsof
completemap of thesocial terrain
such
attempted
life.ThelateRobertMcNealbravely
discrete
areasofinstitutional
and
McNealprovides
a fresh
Stalin:ManandRuler.34
a synthesis
inhisbiography
and
sourcesas well as thenew scholarship
soberreadingof manytraditional
rejectsattempts
at psychological
McNealexplicitly
recently
published
memoirs.
yethe acceptssuch a
explanations
of Stalin'scrueland morbidpersonality,
andStalin's
torelatetherecordofterror
personality
as fact.He worksthroughout
He
andinstitutional
factors.
enormous
politicalskillswithlargersocial,cultural,
Stalin.Theestablished
torehabilitate
putsitbluntly:
"Thereis nopointintrying
andoppressed
on a grand
thathe slaughtered,
tortured,
imprisoned
impression
this
scale is not in error.On the otherhandit is impossibleto understand
solelyto him all the crimesand
immensely
giftedpoliticianby attributing
anda mentalcase.
ofhisera,or to conceivehimsimplyas a monster
suffering
as
regarded
inwhathe,andmanyothers,
Fromyouthuntildeathhewasa fighter
a justwar."35
thatStalinwas "incorruptible
assessment
McNealagreeswithKhrushchev's
in classquestions.
andirreconcilable
It was oneofhisstrongest
qualitiesandhe
withMcNeal'sbookcomeswhen
forit."36The problem
was greatly
respected
the
disputesconcerning
one looksforanswersto someof thehistoriographical
McNealmaintains
that
Stalinera.On thequestion
oftheendofNEP,forexample,
therewas an economiccrisisand thattheidea of a new class warhad social
Komsomoland Partyactivistswho were
amongyounger
supportparticularly
idealism.On collectivization,
he similarly
triestoreconcile
motivated
bygenuine
sometimes
camefromthemiddleandlowerlevelsofthe
theideathatinitiatives
ofeverymove.
withthelong-held
viewofStalinas mastermind
powerstructure
and notsolelya drydiscussionof domesticpolicy.In a
Butthisis biography
entitled
"Murder"(following
chap.8, "Builder"),McNealtakesup the
chapter
and triesto pin down the dictator's
violentnatureof Stalin's personality
for
Basically,he arguesthatStalinwas "moreor lessresponsible
responsibility.
totheauthor's
oftheenemy"(p. 161). Thisrefers
thekillingofa largenumber
in theclass struggle
seenas the
combatant
visionof Stalinas a self-proclaimed
highestformof war. But in thischapterMcNeal also takesup the issue of
the deathsof Stalin's firstwife Nedezhda
individualmurders,specifically
AlliluevaandSergeiKirov,Stalin'scronyandpossiblerival.
McNealbelievesAllilueva'sdeathin 1932tohavebeensuicide,andherightly
aboutmurder
ofrumors
eventsgaverisetoa widearray
pointsoutthatsubsequent
thatspreadin theGulagcamps,amongemigres,and thelike. The "morbid
withhiscomrades
datednotfromthistragedy
ofStalin'srelations
deterioration"
on December1, 1934.Hereagain,McNealfindsthat
butfromtheKirovmurder
Thereis good
is onlycircumstantial.
thebestevidenceforStalinas murderer
On theotherhand,
in thesecurity
evidenceofconspiratorial
apparatus.
activity
beentheleaderofanorganized
McNealarguesthattheevidenceforKirovhaving
34 McNeal (n. 9 above).
35 Ibid., p. 312.
36

Ibid.
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thatsucha
is thinandsuggests
to Stalin,or a "liberalalternative,"
opposition
(now
of suchdissident
of thewishful
thinking
is largelytheproduct
conclusion
Still,McNealseemsto findStalin
as RoyMedvedev.37
historians
establishment)
of
rival.McNealfindsthepattern
becauseofKirov'sstatusas a potential
guilty
and
of a newruthless
Stalin'sresponseto eventsat thistimeto be indicative
of
towardformer
comrades,and he uses Stalin'shumiliation
paranoidattitude
and
McNealpresents
AbelEnukidzeas theexamplethatclosesoutthechapter.
weighstheevidenceon all sidesoftheseissues,butin theendwe areno closer
riddles.
answersto thehistoriographical
to definitive
what
vindictiveness,
toclasswarandhispersonal
GivenStalin'scommitment
does McNealmakeof thepurgesof the1930s?He comesdownon thesideof
thattheworstexcessesofthe1936-38period
namely,
interpretations,
traditional
Stalin
indeed,inthecase oftheEzhovshchina,
from
thecenter;
wereorchestrated
ButwasStalinmad,as Khrushchev
foritsdesign."38
responsible
was "personally
impliedin his "secretspeech"?AgainMcNeal givesa judiciousbutevasive
his"ownreality"
effective
inprojecting
thatStalinwasremarkably
answer,
noting
and
ofpeople."Andso terror,
rationality
madness)ontolargenumbers
(possibly
inSovietsocietyunderStalinas inhis
intertwined
appearas inextricably
insanity
and the
relations
therecordon center-periphery
persona."McNealdownplays
ofthepurges
away
ontherelatively
autonomous
workings
ofArchGetty
arguments
wellto speak onlyof theEzhovshchina-the
preferring
fromthe center,39
So
involvement
paramount.
purgesinwhichhe findsStalin'spersonal
publicized
argument
ingeneral
as wellas Getty's
theissueofthepurges
ina sensehesidesteps
fromthelargerissueofpurges,ittoo
is separate
that,eveniftheEzhovshchina
ofbureaucratization.
torealproblems
as a radicalresponse
oughttobe redefined
McNeal'sanalysislosesitsfocus.He
Hereandon thesubjectofcollectivization
forexnatureof collectivization,
unplanned
thehaphazard,
wantsto recognize
thepaceandattacking
thatStalincamelatetoa hardlineonforcing
ample,arguing
andprovincial
members
politburo
theKulaksandthatmuchcanbeblamedonother
workontheUral-Siberian
method
impliesa moreclear-cut
officials.
YetTaniuchi's
withthetransformation
central
policyon forcedlocalmobilizations,
government
agentsas a
government
intomoreviablecentral
ofthelocalpartyorganizations
is too
yetthefieldofSoviethistory
result.McNeal'scautiousworkis impressive,
freshto permit
closureon theStalinproblem.
37 Here thedebatefocuseson thevotesStalingarnered
partycongressfor
at theseventeenth
In
his postas generalsecretary.
forretaining
a prerequisite
reelection
to thecentralcommittee,
Soviet
journal,Medvedevandthefirst
a recentinterview
intheleadingSovietacademichistorical
had
scholarship
thatWestern
bothagreedheartily
of Stalin,GeneralD. Volkogonov,
biographer
of Stalinor of theStalinproblem.In fact,Medvedevwent
contributed
littleto an understanding
the debates.If such intolerant
so faras to claim thatWesterners
had littlebusinessentering
thepromise
of Sovietacademicinstitutions,
attitudes
manifest
in thenewleadership
themselves
era will neverbe realized."O Stalinei
of therevolutionary
of a pluralistSoviethistoriography
Stalinizme:Beseda s D. A. Volkogonovym
i R. D. Medvedevym,"IstoriiaSSSR 3 (1989):
89-108.
38 McNeal, p. 200.
39 J. ArchGetty,
PartyReconsidered,
Originsof theGreatPurges:The SovietCommunist
1933-1938 (Cambridge,1985).
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and the fieldnow has an
Excitingvistashave openedin Soviethistory,
unprecedented
opportunity
to further
itsagendas.The openingof thestateand
manyregionalarchives(although
thePartyarchivesremainclosedto foreign
a newdegreeofcooperation
theoutpouring
of
researchers);
fromSovietlibraries;
documentary
and memoirpublications
in theUSSR; theexistencethereof a
trained
cadreof brilliant
working
in theunderground
but
intellectuals
formerly
now able to collectmaterials,
documents,
and the like; the
oral histories,
readyandableto engagein
formation
of neworganizations
of Soviethistorians
andcollaboration
with
dialogue;andthenumerous
newpossibilities
forexchange
Soviethistorians
andarchivists
institutions-all
established
andtheirsupporting
pointthewaytoward
thefurther
development
ofthefield.Still,onemustbe wary
of thepitfalls.
periodizations,
and
Amongthesearetheuse of stalecategories,
traditions
of
problematics
(sometimes
takenover fromthe mostmainstream
todecodethelanguage
ofSovietsources;a toonarrow
Sovietscholarship);
failure
tothe1920sor 1930s
definition
ofwhatis "Soviet" thatlimits
thefieldofinquiry
as if all history
of therelevanceof therich
beganin 1921 or 1929;rejection
of thedecadesleadingto 1917;andtheparochialism
of Soviethistoriography
Recentchallenges
to the
centeredness
thatdeniesanycomparative
dimension.
oftheconstruction
imperial
nature
oftheUSSR shouldalsospura reconsideration
Itis clearthattheimperial
ofRussianandSovietselfandnational
project
identity.
ofstate,society,
and
of 1918-24wasateveryjuncture
totheconstruction
related
of
party.It was Stalin,afterall, who as head of thePeoples'Commissariat
forthepeculiar
forms
adopted
Nationalities
(Narkomnats)
waslargely
responsible
fortheUnionof SovietSocialistRepublics.Thissolution
maybe viewedas an
fortheemerging
Stalingoverning
watershed
early,butprofound,
post-Leninist
bloc.It wasStalin,forexample,wholedtheonslaught
againstSultanGalievand
showtrialof
communism.
The Stalin-orchestrated
hisbrandofMuslimnational
SultanGalievin 1923 and thenamingof his ideas as an "ism"-a different,
thatcouldonlybe
variantof communism
and intolerable
deeplythreatening,
thekindsof
utterly
destroyed
bythecentralized
empireinSovietguise-illustrate
of Soviethistory.40
and enrichourunderstanding
connections
thatcan inform
of twentieth-century
Russia have workedwonders.May the field
Historians
flourish.

40
to be publishedby
book on Stalin and Narkomnats
See Steven Blank's forthcoming
Press.
Northern
IllinoisUniversity
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